Updates from DOE
DOE’s Role as an Honest Broker in Financing Energy Projects: Following the History Of LPO and Recent Evolution as the Rebranded EDF
By Brian Mahar, DOE alum of the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations and Loan Programs Office
March 18, 2026
The U.S. Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (LPO), now referred to as the Office of Energy Dominance Financing (EDF), has had a busy Q1 2026:
DOE and EDF leadership announced on January 22 that it is restructuring, substantially revising, or eliminating over $83.6 billion in loans and conditional commitments.
Greg Beard was appointed as the office’s Director on February 3.
On February 25, EDF announced the program’s largest deal in history, a $26.5 billion package to Southern Company for projects in Alabama and Georgia
Part 1 of this series outlines the history of LPO and part 2 will address these recent announcements and what their impact could be.
The Business of Energy
It all started with Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which created the Innovative Energy Loan Guarantee Program to provide senior, secured debt financing for first-of-a-kind commercial deployments of energy technologies that lowered carbon emissions in the United States. The law was shepherded by House Energy and Commerce Chairman Joe Barton (R-TX) and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Pete Domenici (R-NM), and signed into law by President George W. Bush. While originally to provide $51 billion in debt primarily to finance coal gasification and nuclear projects, the market shifted away from those technologies.
At the time, DOE was known for two things: protecting the nuclear arsenal (and managing the environmental legacy of the Manhattan Project), and basic research and development of energy technologies. The Innovative Energy Loan Guarantee Program pushed DOE into the deployment of energy technologies. This meant that DOE’s expertise at the time focused on the science of energy rather than the business of energy. Leadership was reticent about adding deployment to the department’s mission, which resulted in a slow rollout of the program, which was originally housed within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer.
In 2007, the Bush Administration hired David Frantz, a 25-year veteran of international project finance to lead the Loan Guarantee Program. One of the core lessons he brought to DOE that has been passed down over the years is that “project finance is a team sport.” Not only within the lending organization, but with the borrower, too.
Commercial-scale deployment was further added to DOE’s portfolio when the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 created the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program to provide up to $25 billion in low-interest loans to manufacturers of more fuel efficient light-duty vehicles (and their components) in the United States.
Recovery Efforts and Change of Pace
With the financial crisis of 2008, the incoming Obama administration saw the value of these loan programs for financing “steel in the ground” projects. The two programs were eventually rolled into a new Loan Programs Office (LPO). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 infused new money into the Innovative Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Referred to as Section 1705 (creatively named after the section of the law), it removed the innovation requirements for projects and subsidized the credit subsidy cost (a federal government lending cost typically paid for by the borrower), while placing a deadline on closing loans of September 30, 2011. With this cash infusion and deadline, DOE had to build from scratch one of the world’s largest investment banks with dispatch. One of the few positive side effects of the financial crisis was that highly experienced private sector bankers were available and motivated by public service to take on the challenge of financing potentially game-changing energy projects.
Adhering to the philosophy that project finance is a team sport, LPO was the only lender in the game for utility-scale renewable energy projects amidst the credit crunch of the time, despite market demand. Through the Section 1705 program, LPO provided $16 billion in financing for 26 projects. The portfolio has been an overall success, particularly in helping to catalyze utility-scale photovoltaic solar development in the United States. Altogether, six projects have exited the portfolio through repayment and three solar manufacturing projects defaulted (and one withdrew after several years without receiving loan disbursements). Additionally, LPO loaned $8 billion between 2009-2010 to Ford, Nissan, and Tesla through the ATVM program to establish or refurbish vehicle manufacturing facilities; all of these loans have been repaid in full. All done while building up the entire organization practically from scratch.
One of the lessons learned from this early Innovative Energy Loan Guarantee Program activity was a future emphasis on project financing versus corporate financing. However, this led to frustration from prospective manufacturing applicants because LPO originators expressed a strong preference for contracted offtake agreements for the tenor of the loan or third-party guarantees. This is a recognition that LPO saw its role as addressing technology risk – because it had the mission and expertise that private lenders lacked – and not market risk. In that way, LPO was not displacing private capital, but rather acting as a force multiplier and lender of last resort.
From the sunset of Section 1705 program loan origination until mid-2013, LPO focused mostly on building a portfolio management function for its multi-billion dollar portfolio and closing the loans for the Vogtle nuclear expansion that received a conditional commitment in 2010. However, when solar manufacturer and Section 1705 borrower Solyndra filed for bankruptcy in September 2011, that project became the only lens through which LPO was viewed for several years. This public criticism became a factor amongst prospective applicants deciding whether to apply, creating distance between the Department and potential loan applicants.
LPO Reboot
After numerous audits from the Inspector General, Government Accountability Office, and Independent Consultant Herb Allison, new Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz reviewed LPO and determined that the program could be a valuable asset for the nation’s energy future. LPO could, in essence, serve as an honest broker between the science of energy and the business of energy.
Starting in late 2013, LPO began soliciting new applications for both the Innovative Energy and ATVM loan programs. LPO closed on loan guarantees to the owners of the Vogtle nuclear reactors in 2014 and 2015; however, Vogtle was the only non-1705 loan guarantee that LPO had closed since its inception in 2005. The market generally did not believe that LPO was open for new business. Further complicating efforts was that the program’s processes were designed after DOE’s grant-making process for R&D and pilot projects, which did not end up being the best fit for debt financing of commercial-scale projects. While the applicants that came in could generally pass the program eligibility phase, they would linger in the project viability phase after having paid application fees.
To address this issue, LPO went through the process of changing its rules for originating loans to make its loan origination process more closely resemble the commercial lending process that borrowers were used to. Instead of releasing a competitive solicitation that only allowed staff to discuss program generalities and not project specifics, LPO could reach out to prospective applicants and provide input about the key project components that the office would be reviewing in applications and into the due diligence. With the announcement of a conditional commitment to the Lake Charles Methanol project in late 2016, and a stronger pipeline of projects, it appeared that LPO was picking up momentum.
More Stops and Starts
With the election of President Donald J. Trump in 2016, the new administration’s skinny budget proposed completely shutting down LPO. Upon further review of LPO and understanding that it managed a multi-billion dollar portfolio of long-term government loans, future requests provided administrative funding for portfolio management, but elimination of new loan activity.
Circumstances changed in 2017. In March, Westinghouse Electric Company declared bankruptcy. Cost overruns as the lead contractor for construction of the new nuclear reactors at the Vogtle and V.C. Summer projects were a major cause. While initially concerned about the bankruptcy’s impacts on construction at Vogtle and potential recovery of billions in loan disbursements, LPO’s highly experienced financial and technical staff reassured DOE’s new leadership that the loan was structured in a way that practically ensured the federal government would recoup its investment whether the project was ever finished or not. While construction at V.C. Summer was eventually shelved, thanks in part to LPO’s proactive portfolio management and technical expertise, Vogtle construction continued.
The FY 2017 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act provided DOE with funding for the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program (later renamed the Tribal Energy Financing Program (TEFP)), more than a decade after it had been authorized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. In February 2018, Secretary Rick Perry assigned the new program to LPO as the department’s center of lending expertise and instructed the program to engage in outreach to Tribal nations to originate loans.
A series of continuing resolutions kept LPO afloat, but staffing levels dipped to half of what they had been during peak 1705 activity. Also, during that time, LPO cleaned up its pipeline of projects based solely on whether the project wanted to stay in the pipeline and had a reasonable pathway to final investment decision .
Eventually, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 included administrative funding for LPO’s loan programs and specific instructions for LPO to originate new loans. And, in 2019, LPO continued its support of Vogtle – the first new nuclear construction in the United States in 30 years – by announcing an additional set of loan guarantees.
With clear congressional direction, LPO rebooted the outreach and business development it had begun in 2016 under its new rules. LPO leadership continued to make improvements and reduce costs related to the application process. Outreach and Business Development staff led hundreds of pre-application consultation meetings to help prospective applicants understand whether moving forward with LPO would be a prudent decision. And, if it was, to remain engaged with LPO and hold off on formally applying until project viability factors of the project had been further developed, thus attempting to reduce the time between application and loan closing.
A Surplus of Activity and Authority
When President Joe Biden was elected, numerous projects were well down the path of LPO’s pre-application consultation process and were ready to apply. By November 2021, LPO had received 66 applications.
With passage of the Energy Act of 2020, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) in November 2021 and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022, LPO was infused with new funding for existing programs and new authorities to finance State Energy Financing Institution projects, Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment projects, and Carbon Dioxide Infrastructure projects. More about the impacts of the Energy Act and IIJA is available here and the impacts of IRA is available here.
With a loan authority of up to $350 billion, DOE staffed up the organization with the goal of building an enduring financing institution that was capable of closing three deals per month. However, with a staff that had dipped below 100 and authority for potentially hundreds of billions of dollars of projects, LPO once again had to “build the car while driving it.” A diverse array of professionals from across DOE, other federal agencies, and the private sector heeded the call and LPO federal and contracted staff eventually exceeded 400.
In June 2022, LPO closed its first non-Vogtle loan guarantee under the Innovative Energy program to the ACES Delta energy storage facility in Utah. LPO began engaging with early forms of the project during President Obama’s second term and re-engaged in robust pre-application consultations throughout 2020 during President Trump’s first administration.
Meanwhile, construction of Vogtle Reactor 3 was completed in 2024, with Secretary Jennifer Granholm attending the dedication. That meant that five secretaries across three administrations were engaged from conditional commitment to commissioning. Eventual repayment of the loan will likely cross several new administrations. While this is an extreme example, it highlights the lengthy timelines of developing and operating large-scale energy infrastructure projects and the importance of consistent project partners.
By December 2024, LPO had 191 active applicants for nearly $300 billion and was averaging one new application per week. Market demand drove applications from such diverse sectors as renewables deployment, advanced nuclear, carbon management, advanced fossil, offshore wind, clean fuels & products, transmission, VPPs, hydrogen, storage, and manufacturing of advanced vehicles/components, critical materials, and renewables.
From June 2022 to December 2024, LPO announced 53 deals totaling approximately $107.57 billion in committed project investment––approximately $46.95 billion for 28 active conditional commitments and approximately $60.62 billion for 25 closed loans and loan guarantees. Similar to the weeks leading up to the sunset of the 1705 program, many of these loan announcements came in the final months of 2024 after implementation rules and proper staffing had been put in place.
One of the best lenses through which to measure a financing institution’s success is through its portfolio. As of the end of 2025, LPO has only lost 2.1% of total disbursements and interest paid exceeds losses by more than $5 billion. While the innovative nature of LPO-financed projects makes it hard to compare, this loss ratio compares favorably with non-innovative portfolios.
Here’s Where We’re at and Here’s What’s Happening
In January 2025, President Trump returned to the White House with Chris Wright taking the helm of the Department, later renaming LPO to the Office of Energy Dominance Financing (EDF).
This year, DOE and EDF leadership announced on January 22 that it is restructuring, substantially revising, or eliminating over $83.6 billion in loans and conditional commitments. This includes:
De-obligating or in the process of de-obligating $29.9 billion out of $103.47 billion in Biden-era principal loan obligations,
Revising or in the process of revising $53.6 billion of $103.47 billion in Biden-era principal loan obligations. According to EDF, “‘Revising’ may include various loan actions such as amendments, modifications, or restructurings.”
Eliminating ~$9.5 billion in projects that utilize wind and solar technologies, and where possible replacing those projects with natural gas and nuclear uprates.
Closing $4.1 billion in loans out of the $46.95 billion in active conditional commitments that the Biden Administration passed to the new administration.
In that same announcement, new director Greg Beard laid out EDF’s priorities for 2026. With more than $289 billion lending authority, EDF is prioritizing six sectors. According to the announcement, they are:
Nuclear: EDF financing is supporting the reinvigoration of America's nuclear industrial base to help meet increased demand.
Coal, oil, gas, and hydrocarbons: EDF financing is reinvigorating America’s clean coal, oil, gas, and hydrocarbons industries to unleash sources of affordable, reliable, and efficient energy.
Critical materials and minerals: EDF financing is increasing American mineral production to ensure national security and economic resilience.
Geothermal: EDF financing is supporting new innovations in geothermal technologies, helping to unleash a potent source of domestic energy.
Grid and transmission: EDF financing is helping strengthen the reliability and security of the national electric grid through transmission, storage, and utility upgrades.
Manufacturing and transportation: EDF financing is serving as an investment accelerator for U.S. manufacturing and transportation, supporting job creation and supply chains.
These priorities align closely with the DOE reorganization announced on November 20, 2025.
On February 25, EDF announced the program’s largest deal in history, a $26.5 billion package to Southern Company for projects in Alabama and Georgia that include new gas-fired power plants, nuclear uprates and license renewals, hydropower modernization, battery energy storage systems, and transmission and grid enhancement. As an owner of Vogtle, Southern Company has been a partner with EDF since its early days. The Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment Program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 stimulated a new engagement on this deal.
These recent announcements shed light on DOE’s direction for EDF. But, they do leave some questions.
What Do These Recent Decisions Mean
LPO/EDF has traditionally functioned best for commercial deployment as an honest broker and long-term project partner. Given the years that it takes to develop and construct large-scale energy infrastructure projects, it means that almost all projects will cross administrations.
Cleaning out the pipeline is not unprecedented and is a healthy practice to ensure staff are working on deals with a reasonable prospect of achieving commercial operation. Restructuring is also a standard lending practice given that market or project dynamics can change over time and is a part of the “project finance is a team sport” ethos. For EDF to retain its hard-earned trust as an honest broker and enduring government partner, it’s important to understand whether these cancellations are driven by market or project realities or by other factors. Understanding this will be vital for private sector decisions on how and if it will continue to engage with EDF.
So, how does this recent activity impact EDF’s role?
Based on the priorities list above, will the growing market for virtual power plants (VPPs) be welcome as part of the grid and transmission priority? And will transmission projects that are intended to expand renewable deployment in markets that are prioritizing renewables be welcomed?
While manufacturing is mentioned, what role will the ATVM program play when it comes to critical materials and minerals projects or manufacturing projects? This is particularly relevant given termination of electric vehicle (EV) tax credits and charging infrastructure incentives by the One Big Beautiful Bill and the enactment of tariffs that impacted EVs (which are now also up in the air).
The TEFP loan program for Tribal nations that was rolled out during the first Trump administration is not mentioned in the EDF look ahead. U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) highlighted recommendations for improving access to this program in September 2025. With the rescission of unobligated IRA funds for TEFP and cuts for tribal energy incentives in the One Big Beautiful Bill, including $500 million in Solar For All that were directed to tribal lands, will EDF act on the recommendations and play a role in supporting tribal energy sovereignty?
Over the past year, EDF has negotiated new deals or revised existing deals to include federal government equity ownership or warrants (i.e. a financial instrument typically used in venture debt that gives a lender the right to purchase equity shares at a fixed price by a certain time). The tenor of these loans can often reach 20 years, often requiring thoughtful restructuring to ensure the best outcome for both the project and the federal government. Historically, LPO’s policy has been to avoid the federal government getting into the ownership of large-scale energy infrastructure and auto manufacturing facilities. Owning and/or operating commercial facilities has not historically been a DOE role and requires expertise for which the private sector or other institutions may be better equipped.
Additionally, warrants have a dilutive effect on the ownership of existing investors by their nature. If EDF were to exercise those warrants, the federal government could potentially dilute private sector ownership. This has guided the approach until now for EDF portfolio managers to focus on long-term project success because the government has not wanted to foreclose and take ownership if a project defaults. Also, it allows more lessons on project startup and early operations to be learned for innovative technologies. Many will be looking to see whether projects that were looking to build in the United States with EDF financing continue their plans or look to foreign markets.
As mentioned above, lending institutions are best viewed through a portfolio lens. At the director’s request in 2018, LPO began publishing a public version of its annual portfolio status report (APSR) to increase public transparency and explain to industry how it acts as a long-term project partner. Likewise, LPO consistently maintained a list of its entire portfolio, including projects that defaulted. The APSR was not published for FY2024 and the EDF Portfolio Projects webpage no longer lists EDF’s historical portfolio, but rather only lists the $4.1 billion in loans closed by the current administration. It will be interesting to see if EDF returns to publishing an annual APSR and providing information about its entire portfolio of projects.
Finally, EDF employs one of the most talented financing teams in the world. Seasoned professionals take large pay cuts to come work on groundbreaking projects and to support their country. Young professionals come to EDF to learn from the best and how to do the tough deals that private sector lenders don’t want to do. No one comes to EDF to do easy things. Will EDF have the staff to continue to play its important role as an honest broker in energy financing? And, will EDF continue to be an incubator for talented energy professionals including bankers, engineers, and lawyers to take what they have learned and propagate those lessons in the private sector?
Developers and private sector finance will continue watching EDF closely in 2026 as they evaluate how or if they will work with the office. Project developers and investors are putting tens, if not hundreds of millions at risk. They need to understand that EDF is a steady reliable partner for the long run and that the government’s role will be consistent throughout the life of the project. Will it continue to allow the market to bring the best projects to it? Or will it pick technology winners and losers? Will EDF continue considering project finance as a team sport and its historical role as an honest broker? Or will it assert itself into a role of state ownership of private entities?
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This piece was drafted by trusted and vetted alumni of the U.S. Department of Energy. Any views and opinions expressed are that of the author(s) and do not reflect those of the DOE Alumni Network.